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Abstract 
The theory on the timing of liquidity trades highlights two contrasting rational 
expectations equilibria for the liquidity adjustment speed effect, namely an 
immediate-trading equilibrium (trade at the onset of the liquidity shock) and a 
delayed-trading equilibrium (trade at the last resort). Using a partial adjustment model 
and an annual data sample of US bank holding companies from 1991 to 2012, we 
investigate the effect of Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) adjustment speeds on 
systemic risk. We find that banks with the immediate-trading equilibrium tend to 
adjust the NSFR quickly in response to the Basel III liquidity requirement, thereby, 
reducing systemic risk. With the same level of the NSFR, our findings suggest that 
only the adjustment speed exerts a negative impact on systemic risk. Our evidence 
shows that small banks strengthen the effects of the negative impact of the NSFR 
adjustment speed on systemic risk. Our study sheds light on a real-time indicator of 
the NSFR for Basel III revisions before its implementation in 2018.  
 
Keywords: Net Stable Funding ratio; Basel III; systemic risk; adjustment speed 
JEL Classification: G200, G210, G280 
 
1 Introduction 
Liquidity pressure is the first overt sign of a banking crisis and has become a 
serious concern since the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In the post-crisis revisions, 
known as Basel III, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS 2013) 
introduced a quantity-based liquidity standard, Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), to 
strengthen bank liquidity risk management practices. This represents a starting point 
to quantify individual banks’ market-implied vulnerability to system-wide funding 
constraints during the period of stress. Faced with the new prudential standard, an 
open question that has recently been asked concerns whether the adjustment frictions 
of the NSFR affect systemic risk? Since the liquidity problem has escalated all 
systemic crises (Jobst 2014) , such a liquidity change should be reflected in each 
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bank’s adjustment speeds relative to the increase in stable funding in response to 
systemic liquidity risk. However, to the best of our knowledge, this specific issue has 
not been formally investigated to date. Our paper therefore draws attention to the 
market-based evaluation of the riskiness of the whole banking system by using a 
measure of dynamic exposure via a risk-adjusted value – the NSFR.  
It is important to study the effect of the adjustment speed of the NSFR on 
systemic risk. First, the 2007–2009 ﬁnancial crisis is a concrete evidence since banks 
across countries suffered liquidity shortages due to the dislocation of wholesale bank 
funding markets, and thus a total meltdown of the financial system (Acharya and 
Merrouche 2012, Billio et al. 2012, Afonso et al. 2011, Huang and Ratnovski 2011, 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). Hence, acknowledging how the new liquidity 
standard influences systemic risk is important in the Basel III reform process. Second, 
Basel III evaluates banks’ long-term liquidity using the NSFR (Distinguin et al. 2013, 
Yan et al. 2012). The traditional liquidity requirement for individual bank does not 
work as systemic stability; however, the reaction of banks is a real response to policy 
makers.  
Our paper departs from the intersection of two literatures on liquidity risk 
management. The first departure is the definition of the NSFR. King (2013) defines 
the NSFR as the ratio of the available amount of stable funding (ASF) divided by the 
required amount of stable funding (RSF). If the RSF is higher than the ASF, it implies 
that banks are exposed to the risk of selling assets at fire sale prices to repay the 
liabilities claim on demand. The NSFR is assessed according to market prices to 
generate a time-varying measure of funding risk and only excessive maturity 
mismatches indicates regulatory implications for the social costs of system-wide 
constraints in stress periods (Jobst 2014). The more the potential funding constraints 
are projected by a declining NSFR, the larger the expected losses from liquidity risk 
will be (Jobst 2014).  
The second departure is the likelihood of falling below the boundary of the NSFR 
conditions on the individual funding choice and bank’s experiencing of a liquidity 
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shortage due to a common funding shock (Jobst and Gray 2013). Countervailing 
arguments challenge the view that when all banks face the same deterioration of stable 
funding, the way in which an individual bank treats the risk of selling assets at fire 
sales prices to repay the liabilities claim on demand has an impact on the degree of 
systemic risk.  
Our hypotheses are put forward by the novel theory on the timing of liquidity 
trades introduced by Bolton et al. (2011) in terms of two rational scenarios, namely 
the immediate-trading equilibrium (trade at the onset of the liquidity shock) versus the 
delayed-trading equilibrium (trade at the last resort). In times of stress, banks face the 
choice between liquidating early before adverse selection problems and riding out the 
crisis at more depressed prices. In the immediate-trading equilibrium, higher future 
lemon problems cause an acceleration of trade (Akerlof 1970). Dornbusch (1991) 
argues that the higher the cost of failure is, the greater the incentives for rapid 
adjustment should be. If banks could adjust the funding risk quickly to reduce their 
individual expected losses, the joint probability of all banks experiencing a liquidity 
shortfall simultaneously will decline, hence reducing the systemic risk (Jobst 2014). 
Altogether, we propose the first hypothesis that banks with an immediate-trading 
equilibrium tend to adjust the NSFR quickly; therefore, the systemic risk can be 
reduced. 
An opposite view, modelled by Bolton et al. (2011), shows that worssening 
asymmetric information leads to an increase in the cost of outside liquidity. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) argue that a liquidity shock raises the expectation 
about the future volatility, therefore lowering the market liquidity. When the funding 
condition is tight, banks become more reluctant to take on positions. In other words, 
Bolton et al. (2011) emphasize that when the adverse selection problem becomes 
severe, the delayed-trading equilibrium occurs. When the market liquidity and lemon 
problems are highly sensitive to the change in the funding condition, liquidity spirals 
will ruin the stability of the system (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). Therefore, we 
posit the second hypothesis that banks with the delayed-trading equilibrium tend to be 
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reluctant to respond to an increased cost of funding, resulting in increased systemic 
risk.  
    A partial adjustment model has hence attracted considerable attention from the 
studies on the nature of the adjustment process (Flannery and Rangan 2006 , Leary 
and Roberts 2005, Hovakimian et al. 2001). However, this model has been 
significantly employed in the capital structure rather than the liquidity structure, 
leaving it largely unexplored in the bank liquidity literature. In this paper, we attempt 
to adapt this decent dynamic model to fill the gap and provide some novel empirical 
results about the impact of banks’ liquidity adjustments on systemic risk. 
    Our data are obtained from two sources. The bank holding company (BHC) data 
are collected annually from the FRY-9 reports over the period from 1991 to 2012. The 
stock prices data come from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We 
find that when banks adjust their liquidity promptly to comply with the new Basel III 
regulation, the systemic risk underlying the whole financial system is significantly 
undermined. Our finding shows that banks tend to adopt an immediate-trading 
equilibrium in response to the Basel III reform on the NSFR, therefore, reducing 
systemic risk, consistent with our first hypothesis. In the immediate-trading 
equilibrium, greater future lemon problems cause an acceleration of trade (Akerlof 
1970). This is in line with our hypothesis suggesting that if banks adjust their funding 
risk quickly to reduce their individual expected losses, the joint probability of all 
banks experiencing a liquidity shortfall simultaneously will decline, hence reducing 
the systemic risk. Therefore, the long term benefit of combined actions leads to a 
more stabilized financial system and lower systemic risk. With the same level of the 
NSFR, our findings suggest that only the adjustment speed exerts a negative impact 
on systemic risk. Our evidence shows that small banks strengthen the effects of the 
negative impact of NSFR adjustment speed on systemic risk. 
 This paper is written at a time of significant Basel III reform of liquidity; 
therefore, it makes several contributions. First, we are the first to employ a 
partial-adjustment model of the NSFR in Basel III and we add more evidence to the 
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literature on the adjustment speeds model (Flannery and Rangan 2006 , Leary and 
Roberts 2005, Hovakimian et al. 2001). Second, this paper contributes to our 
knowledge of how banks react to the NSFR requirement and its impact on systemic 
risk. From the theoretical point of view, our paper complements the work of 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) in that the delay regime reinforces the liquidity 
spirals, leading to higher systemic risk. As documented in Ratnovski (2013) study, 
which states that liquidity buffers and information asymmetry are strategic substitutes 
in liquidity management, our paper puts forward more evidence that banks tend to be 
in favour of building liquidity as quickly as possible to negate the cost of information 
asymmetry in the midst of squeezed funding markets.  
 Third, Jobst (2014) suggests that the current proposed liquidity standard of the 
NSFR in Basel III will be not able to determine the potential liquidity shortfall in time 
of stress. Using our results for BHCs in the US, we raised the interesting point that if 
liquidity shortfalls happen simultaneously, a joint slow speed of adjustment relative to 
the interlinkages in funding positions may expose the banking system to funding 
shocks. Therefore, failing to take into account the speed of liquidity adjustment would 
lead to an underestimation of the system-wide liquidity shortfall.  
 The liquidity requirement has more predictable power than the capital buffer in 
systemic effects (Cifuentes et al. 2005). Therefore, a number of recommendations for 
policy makers and practitioners are provided. First, our paper recommends a closer 
supervisory practice to identify the liquidity problems of a particular bank. By 
observing the adjustment speed of liquidity, the supervisor can acknowledge that the 
level of bank’s contribution to the overall systemic risk. Second, an integrated 
approach in terms of liquidity and adjustment speed to reach that level is advisable for 
practitioners given the interaction between the liquidity regulation and the liquidity 
decision made by banks. Banks should realize the importance of their speed in 
adjusting their liquidity level in periods of crisis.  
 Third, this paper highlights the importance of the adjustment speed of bank 
liquidity, which can give regulatory authorities insights not only into strengthening the 
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liquidity ratio as required by the new Basel III but also into reinforcing the regulation 
of their reaction speed to reach the target ratio. Given that the short-term wholesale 
funding’s features raise the exposure not only to the interbank markets but also to the 
whole financial system, hence, triggering systemic risk episodes (López-Espinosa et 
al. 2012), the target of the NSFR for more stable funding and its adjustment rate must 
be increased to comply with the Basel III liquidity requirement to keep the probability 
of failing the regulatory Basel III requirement constant in the event of banks’ inability 
to extend the maturity of wholesale funding. Therefore, a real-time indicator of the 
NSFR is a recommended solution as a meaningful measure of their effect on systemic 
risk in the revisions of Basel III before its implementation in 2018.  
    The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes data and methodology. The empirical results are 
presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the discussion.  
 
2 The relationship between the adjustment speed of Net Stable Funding Ratio 
and the systemic risk 
Under the circumstances that all distortions are removed, resources can be 
reallocated without cost. However, in the real word, resources may not be reallocated 
instantaneously without incurring costs (Nsouli et al. 2005). Jobst (2014) emphasizes 
that the adjustment of banks’ liquidity risk profile lies in their banks’ capacity to cover 
the costs of all the expected losses and meet the minimum threshold of market-based 
stable funding. 
  The funding choice in the new prudential reform, Basel III, aims to limit the 
maturity transformation of banks and the NSFR is regarded as a unit of measurement 
to assess banks’ liquidity profile at risk from their liquidity creation activities. King 
(2013) defines that the NSFR as the ratio of the available amount of stable funding 
(ASF) divided by the required amount of stable funding (RSF). It limits bank liquidity 
risk by restricting the maturity mismatch between short-term liabilities and short-term 
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assets. If the RSF is higher than the ASF, it implies that banks are exposed to the risk 
of selling assets at fire sales prices to repay the liabilities claim on demand. Therefore, 
the NSFR explicitly shows the threshold above which banks may face difficulties in 
transformation risk. However, based on their individual conditions, banks may face 
different social cost of their funding choice (Jobst 2014). The proposed Basel III 
liquidity standards highlights that the NSFR component is assessed according to 
market prices to generate a time-varying measure of funding risk and only excessive 
maturity mismatches indicates regulatory implications for the social costs of 
system-wide constraints in periods of stress (Jobst 2014).  
Theoretically, the fact that each bank holds a large liquidity buffer may decrease 
the likelihood that multiple financial institutions will face liquidity shortfall problems 
(Jobst 2014). However, Aikman et al. (2010) argue that this rationale differs in bank 
risk-taking incentives related to diverse funding structures and their impact on 
systemic liquidity risk. The more the potential funding constraints are projected by a 
declining NSFR, the larger the expected losses from liquidity risk will be (Jobst 
2014). Therefore, according to Nsouli et al. (2005), rapid adjustment is greatly 
preferable in a crisis situation. The attention here centres on the importance of the 
adjustment speeds of liquidity in times of stress.  
The novel theory of the timing of liquidity trades originated by Bolton et al. 
(2011) proposes that banks may face two rational expectations, namely the 
immediate-trading equilibrium (trade at the onset of the liquidity shock) versus the 
delayed-trading equilibrium (trade at the last resort). The stress scenario is determined 
by market factors affecting the components of the NSFR (Jobst and Gray 2013). The 
likelihood of falling below the boundary of the NSFR conditions is based on the 
individual funding choice and banks’ experience of a liquidity shortage due to a 
common funding shock. The expected loss from the variation of each bank’s NSFR is 
treated as the joint probability of all banks experiencing a liquidity shortfall 
simultaneously. In two equilibriums, banks could face the trade-off between the cost 
of building liquidity and the lemon problems (Bolton et al. 2011). Countervailing 
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arguments challenge the view that when all banks face the same deterioration of stable 
funding, the way in which individual banks treats the risk of selling assets at fire sales 
prices to repay the liabilities claim on demand influences the degree of systemic risk.  
When the cost of liquidity and asymmetric information is low enough, banks find 
it optimal to combine the two in their liquidity risk management (Ratnovski 2013). 
However, when facing greater lemon problems, banks tend to employ the 
immediate-trading equilibrium to save the cost of building a liquidity buffer. In the 
immediate-trading equilibrium, greater future lemon problems cause an acceleration 
of trade (Akerlof 1970). Bolton et al. (2011) argue that it is cheaper to raise funding at 
the onset of a liquidity shock. To prevent an accelerating funding cost when the 
asymmetric information worsens, banks choose to obtain liquidity quickly at the very 
first stage. It is evident that rapid reforms lead to lower adjustment costs, because 
rapid reforms increase the incentives to relocate resources (Mussa 1984). Dornbusch 
(1991) also argue that the higher the cost of failure, the greater the incentives for rapid 
adjustment should be. Furthermore, the greater the adjustment effort is, the higher the 
probability that success will be achieved. If banks adjust the funding risk quickly to 
reduce their individual expected losses, the joint probability of all banks experiencing 
a liquidity shortfall simultaneously will decline, hence reducing the systemic risk. 
Altogether, we postulate the following 
Hypothesis 1: A higher adjustment speed of the NSFR in the immediate-trading 
equilibrium is more likely to reduce systemic risk. 
In striking contrast, the delayed-trading equilibrium economizes on aggregate 
liquidity (Bolton et al. 2011). Particularly, the vulnerability of the stable funding of 
individual banks is treated as the hazard rate of the ASF falling below the present 
value of the RSF over the given time period. Therefore, this indicates that only the 
funding choice that breaks the threshold of regulatory expectation can be related to 
the social cost of systemic liquidity risk (Jobst 2014).  
Ratnovski (2013) argues that banks tend to obtain market-based wholesale 
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funding to manage their liquidity needs. Worsening asymmetric information leads to 
an increase in the cost of outside liquidity (Bolton et al. 2011). Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) argue that a liquidity shock raises the expectation about the future 
volatility, therefore, lowering the market liquidity. When the funding condition is 
tight, banks become more reluctant to take on positions. In other word, the delayed 
regime is adopted. When the market liquidity and lemon problems are highly sensitive 
to the change in the funding condition, liquidity spirals will ruin the stability of the 
system (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). A higher perceived risk profile of each 
bank as the degree of stable funding decrease introduces market-induced linkages 
among financial institutions (Jobst 2014).  
According to Kyle and Xiong (2001), contagion is defined as the rapid spread 
from one market to another of declining prices and declining liquidity, leading to an 
increased correlation among financial intermediaries. With the delayed response, 
banks tend to suffer from the rapid spread in the midst of lemon problems. The 
mechanism leads to contagion and therefore an increase in systemic risk making the 
crisis worse (Allen and Gale 1998). Collectively, we hypothesize that: 
 Hypothesis 2: A higher adjustment speed of the NSFR in the delayed-trading 
equilibrium is more likely to increase systemic risk. 
3 Methodology and data 
3.1 Variable definitions 
3.1.1 Adjustment speed of the Net Stable Funding Ratio 
    Firstly, we follow Distinguin et al. (2013) to calculate the net stable funding ratio, 
in whichhigher values of the net stable funding ratio indicate higher liquidity. It is 
calculated as the ratio of the available amount of stable funding to the required 
amount of stable funding.  We calculate the NSFR as follows: 
𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 =  
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
                             (1) 
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    In the partial adjustment model, the bank’ current NSFR is a weighted average of 
its target NSFR ratio: 
NSFR it- NSFR it-1=λi (NSFR *it - NSFR it-1)+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                             (2) 
 where NSFR it is the return on the total assets for bank i in year t. NSFR
 *
it is the 
target return on the total assets for bank i in year t. λ means the proportional 
adjustment during one year for bank I; in this context, the lambda captures how far the 
sample banks are operating away from their expected returns. Alternatively, the NSFR 
is predicted to mean revert to a target level, which can be determined by a 
cross-sectional model: 
NSFR *it = 𝛽𝑖Xit-1 + Uit + 𝜀 𝑖𝑡                         (3) 
    where Xit-1 is a vector of bank and macroeconomic characteristics that can 
influence the NSFR. Uit is the fixed effects to control for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. Substituting equation (3) into equation (2) and rearranging the yields, it 
produces the following specification: 
NSFR it=λiβiXit-1 + (1-λi) NSFR it-1 +λi(Uit) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                       (4) 
    From equation (4), it can be seen that In the partial adjustment model, the bank’s 
current NSFR is a weighted average (with the  between 0 and 1) of its expected 
NSFR*, and the NSFR of its previous period, as well as the unobservable fixed effects 
and random shocks. Regarding to the adjustment speed, if the λ is small, it means that 
the adjustment speed is slow, representing a bank’s return on assets (ROA) taking a 
long time to return to its target after a shock. On the other hand, the (1-λi) term before 
the lag value of the ROA in equation (4) is treated as an inertial fact in the partial 
adjustment model.  
    In the partial adjustment model, the expected NSFR* is unavailable and it is not 
li
NSFR= 
0.7*(demand deposits+saving deposits)+1*(long-term liabilities+equity) 
 0.5*(long-term marketable assets+ customer acceptances)+0.85*(consumer 
loans)+1*(commercial loans+other loans+other assets+fixed assets) 
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necessarily constant over time. Here we follow Fama and French (2000) in building a 
model to estimate the expected NSFR*. The cross-sectional model for estimating the 
NSFR * can be summarized as: 
NSFR*it= β0+β1DDit-1+β2ROAit-1+β3SIZEit-1 + β4Capitalit-1 + β5TIER1it-1 + ε      (5) 
    DD is a dummy that equals 1 if the bank pays dividends 0 otherwise, this dummy 
is used to capture the non-linear relationship between dividends issuance and 
profitability. ROA is the net income over total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
total assets. CAPTAL is the total equity to total assets. TIER1 is the TIER1 capital 
over the total assets.  
    Our estimation of the expected NSFR is similar to that of the standard partial 
adjustment model, which is widely used in the capital structure measure of the future 
target of the capital ratio (Flannery and Rangan 2006 ). The expected NSFR* is 
obtained through equation (5) using the Fama-Macbeth regressions. After obtaining 
the estimated NSFR*, we apply equation (2) using a simple autoregressive model to 
estimate each bank’s NSFR adjustment speed. 
 
3.1.2 Systemic risk measure 
      We use two systemic measures, CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier 2008) and 
the systemic expected shortfall (SES) (Acharya et al. 2010).1 
 
3.1.3 Control variables 
    The bank-specific control variables include the bank size (the natural logarithm 
of total assets) (DeMiguel et al. 2013, Haan and Poghosyan 2012, Hakenes and 
Schnabel 2011, Demsetz and Strahan 1999, Gennotte and Pyle 1991), capital ratio, 
diversification (the noninterest income divided by the total operating income), local 
market power (the deposit concentration for the local markets in which the bank is 
                                                             
1 Please refer to Appendix A for details.  
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present (Berger and Bouwman 2013), ROA, non-performing loans, off balance sheet 
(OBS) activities and loan loss provisions. We control the macro-economic 
environment using the real GDP growth (Vassalou and Xing 2004) and inflation rate. 
A description of the variables is provided in Appendix B. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
We examine the following regression model by applying the fixed-effects model:  
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡−1 +
𝛽3𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑣𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (6)  
     where 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is the systemic risk for BHC i in year t gauged using 
two different proxies, which are described in Appendix A. The adjustment speed 
𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 is the NSFR adjustment speed of BHC i in year t-1. Basel III is a dummy 
variable indicating the implementation of the regulation and equals 1 after the year 
2009, and 0 otherwise.  𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡−1 is the interaction 
term between the NSFR adjustment speed and the Basel III dummy.  𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 
vector of a group of control variables representing BHC characteristics as well as 
several macroeconomic statistics that may have an impact on systemic risk. All the 
independent variables are lagged by 1 year.  
 
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
     Our data are obtained from two sources. The BHC data are collected annually 
from the FRY-9 reports over the period from 1991 to 2012. The stock prices data 
come from the Center for Research in Security Prices. We only survey the BHCs in 
the United States.  
     Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. We find that the average BHC has a 
capital ratio of 11%, which demonstrates that most of the BHCs in our sample are 
well capitalized and in general follow the regulation requirement. The revenue 
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sources of BHCs tend not to be largely diversified and their median ROA is only 1% 
of their lagged assets which is also much lower than that of non-financial firms, by 
Lemmon et al. (2008) to be 12%. This matches the earlier finding that stricter 
regulation relative to non-financial firms makes banking appear to be a relatively safe 
and, correspondingly, low-return industry (Gropp and Heider 2010). 
     In terms of the adjustment speed of the NSFR, the final sample presents a 
certain degree of heterogeneity, with BHCs above the upper quartile having roughly 
twice the adjustment speed of those below the lower quartile. This indicates that those 
BHCs at the bottom react fairly slowly in changing their liquidity to reach the target 
ratio, which brings potential risk to the whole financial system.  
     With regard to systemic risk, the first measure CoVaR  has a mean value of 
-3.48% indicating an average 3.48% loss of the entire system returns contributed by 
each bank’s marginal impact. The mean value of the second measure SES, is 1.92%, 
suggesting that the banking industry has roughly a 1.92% expected equity loss below 
the target level conditional on a crisis scenario. 
Both results are lower than those found by Brunnermeier et al. (2012) and 
Acharya et al. (2011). Perhaps this is mainly because they use data from 1986 to 2008, 
whereas our sample includes the entire financial crisis period of 2007-2009, which 
significantly drags down the average value for both measures of systemic risk.  
 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 The impact of the adjustment speed of liquidity on systemic risk 
     In this part, we mainly discuss the impact of the liquidity requirement imposed 
by Basel III on systemic risk. Specifically, we want to test how the NSFR adjustment 
speed under the new regulatory pressure of Basel III influences systemic risk. 
     As reported by Table 2, we find that the interaction of the NSFR adjustment 
speed and the Basel III dummy appears to be robust and significant when we use the 
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SES to quantify the systemic risk, consistent with our first hypothesis. In the 
immediate-trading equilibrium, greater future lemon problems cause an acceleration 
of trade (Akerlof 1970). This confirms our hypothesis in the sense that when banks 
adjust their liquidity promptly to comply with the new Basel III regulation, the 
systemic risk underlying the whole financial system is significantly undermined. Our 
findings suggest that banks tend to adopt an immediate-trading equilibrium in 
response to the Basel III reform of the NSFR to save the cost of building a liquidity 
buffer. If banks adjust their funding risk quickly to reduce their individual expected 
losses, the joint probability of all banks experiencing a liquidity shortfall 
simultaneously will decline, hence reducing the systemic risk. 
 Liquidity Creation is used as an alternative liquidity adjustment speed in our 
study. On the other hand, we do not find consistently significant effects of the 
adjustment speed of either the NSFR or the Liquidity Creation on systemic risk. As a 
matter of fact, it is not difficult to understand that the interaction of the Basel III 
regulation and banks’ corresponding increased speed of NSFR adjustment plays an 
essential part in relieving systemic risk.  
Arguably, the greater pressure imposed by Basel III on liquidity regulation forces 
banks to increase their liquidity adjustment speed to maintain a certain probability of 
complying with the regulatory requirements, very much like the action that banks take 
for the adjustment speed of their capital ratios (Memmel and Raupach 2010, Kleff and 
Weber 2008, Ediz et al. 1998, Shrieves and Dahl 1992). The higher adjustment speed 
shortens bank’s reaction time in the case of falling below the required liquidity ratio, 
thus reducing the likelihood of liquidity risk. The longer term benefit of combined 
actions leads to a more stabilized financial system and lower systemic risk. Our main 
result remains consistent when using the measure of Liquidity Creation. Hence, our 
finding proves a clear role of the adjustment speed of liquidity to prevent systemic 
risk.  
In addition to the above particularly focused explanatory variables, we notice 
that the bank capital ratio, non-performing loans and local market power as well as 
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the GDP growth at the nation level all have significant influences and their effects 
remain consistent for both the measures of systemic risk employed in our analysis. 
The other variables such as diversification, ROA and OBS activities do not appear to 
have uniform impacts or consistent significance in either regression. This implies that 
these individual BHC characteristics do not augment the additional apparent effects 
on systemic risk.  
 
4.2 Banks with similar liquidity levels: do their NSFR adjustment speeds 
matter? 
     Our above estimation procedure assumes that there is symmetric behaviour 
between the immediate-trading equilibrium and the delayed-trading equilibrium for 
both banks that have a below target NSFR and those that exceed it. Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) suggest that there is commonality of liquidity across assets when 
funding shocks occur. Other things being equal, banks with greater liquidity are in a 
better position than banks with lower liquidity in response to liquidity shocks. Since 
banks hold more liquidity in excess of the NSFR minimum requirement, highly-liquid 
banks tend to adjust their liquidity less during times of stress to avoid liquidity 
shortfalls. Thus, one may argue that if banks hold a different amount of NSFR in 
excess of regulatory requirements, this may in turn indicate differences in the 
adjustment speed in response to liquidity shocks. Therefore, the traditional argument 
on liquidity does not discriminate among banks with the same level of liquidity facing 
different adjustment speeds. To address this issue, we conduct a further robustness test 
in this section by employing the propensity score-matching method.  
  In particular, we compare the effect of the NSFR adjustment speed on systemic 
risk between banks with a high NSFR adjustment speed and those with a low NSFR 
adjustment speed given that banks have other similar characteristics. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks with a high NSFR adjustment speed 
(with a value higher than average) and 0 otherwise. We match similar NSFR levels 
between individuals with low and high NSFR adjustment speeds. As the portfolio 
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choices made by highly-liquid banks may differ from those made by banks with 
low-liquidity, their business could be less sensitive to the shock. This, in turn, causes 
highly-liquid banks to react less to a liquidity shock. Therefore, we also match two 
groups of banks by a number of other bank-specific factors, such as bank size, capital 
ratio, diversification ratio, local market power, ROA, non-performing loans, OBS 
activities, loan loss provisions, real GDP growth rate and inflation rate. These bank 
characteristics may be factors distinguishing among banks with the same NSFR 
levels. Table 3 reports the results.  
  Panel A of Table 3 reports the probit regression estimates of the propensity to 
provide a high liquidity adjustment speed. Banks with a higher NSFR adjustment 
speed tend to have less capital, higher diversification, greater local market power, a 
lower ROA, and more OBS activities than those with a lower NSFR adjustment 
speed. Panel B of Table 3 shows that banks with a high NSFR adjustment speed tend 
to reduce systemic risk more than their counterparts with a low NSFR adjustment 
speed after sample matching. The Liquidity Creation measure presents the same 
findings. Our evidence represents a further robustness check to confirm our main 
findings. 
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To completely address completely the concern that it is not the NSFR level but 
the adjustment speed of the NSFR that matters, we provide a further robustness check 
by examining the impact of the liquidity level on systemic risk. Table 4 reports the 
result.  
 
As shown in Table 4, neither the liquidity indicator nor the interaction term of 
liquidity indicators*Basel III influences systemic risk. Our finding again confirms that 
only the adjustment speed could reflect the heterogeneity in banks’ influences on 
systemic risk. Overall, banks are subject to different adjustment speeds of their 
liquidity rather than their liquidity level under the Basel III reform with regard to their 
effect on systemic risk.  
 
4.3 Bank size: Different effects of NSFR adjustment speeds on systemic risk  
According to Jobst (2014), some banks are systemically more important than 
others with respect to the contributions of their funding decisions to systemic risk. 
Freixas et al. (2000) also document that regulators adopt a too-big-to-fail approach to 
deal with large financial institutions. The goal of this section, therefore, is to examine 
whether the effect of the NSFR adjustment speed on systemic risk deviates according 
to the bank size. To facilitate this comparison, we split our sample into three 
sub-samples, as follows (i) small banks, (ii) medium banks and (iii) large banks. 
Small banks are those banks that have total assets of less than $3 billion, medium 
banks are those banks with total assets between $3 billion and $10 billion and large 
banks are those that have total assets of more than $10 billion. Panels A, B and C in 
Table 5 report the results, respectively. 
As indicated in panels A, B, and C of Table 5, we find that our main results holds 
for small banks only with a negative and significant coefficient of adjusted  
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speed*Basel III, indicating that small banks tend to employ an immediate-trading 
equilibrium to adjust their NSFR quickly, thus leading to a decrease in systemic risk. 
The results for medium and large banks are not significant, implying that medium and 
large banks behave differently from their small counterparts. A possible explanation 
could be that large and medium banks can safely access central bank lending facilities 
to prevent the sudden run-off of available funding under stress (Jobst 2014). In 
contrast to medium and large banks, without a generous source from the central 
banks, the adjustment speed of the NSFR tends to be much more important for small 
banks due to the high costs associated with obtaining whole-sale funding.  
 
5 Conclusion 
Our paper departs from the theory of the timing of liquidity trades modelled by 
Bolton et al. (2011) in terms of two rational scenarios, namely the immediate-trading 
equilibrium (trade at the onset of the liquidity shock) versus the delayed-trading 
equilibrium (trade at the last resort). In the immediate-trading equilibrium, greater 
future lemon problems cause an acceleration of trade. An opposite view, modelled by 
Bolton et al. (2011), shows that worsening asymmetric information lead to an increase 
in the cost of outside liquidity, hence, the delayed-trading equilibrium occurs. 
    We employ a partial adjustment model along with annual bank holding company 
data from the FRY-9 reports over the period from 1991 to 2012 and stock price data 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices. Our findings show that banks tend to 
adopt an immediate-trading equilibrium in response to the Basel III reform on the 
NSFR, therefore reducing systemic risk, consistent with our first hypothesis. If banks 
adjust the funding risk quickly to reduce their individual expected losses, the joint 
probability of all banks experiencing a liquidity shortfall simultaneously will decline, 
hence, reducing the systemic risk. With the same level of the NSFR, our findings 
suggest that only the adjustment speed exerts a negative impact on systemic risk. Our 
evidence shows that small banks strengthen the effects of the negative impact of the 
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NSFR adjustment speed on systemic risk. 
A real-time indicator of the NSFR is recommended as a meaningful measure of 
the effect on systemic risk in the revisions of Basel III before its implementation in 
2018. 
 
Appendix A: Empirical estimation method of Delta CoVaR 
To estimate this measure of individual bank’s systemic risk contribution, we 
need to calculate two VaR s for each bank, namely 
isystem
qCoVaR
|
 and 
medianisystem
qCoVaR
,|
. For the systemic risk conditional on bank i  in distress 
(
isystem
qCoVaR
|
), run a 1% quantile regression using the weekly data to estimate the 
coefficients i , 
i , isystem| , isystem|  and isystem| : 
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 And run a 50% quantile (median) regression to estimate the coefficients mediani,  
and 
mediani, : 
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 where itR  is the weekly growth rate of the market-valued assets of bank i  at 
time t : 
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 and systemtR  is the weekly growth rate of the market-valued total assets of all N  
banks in the financial system at time t : 
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 In the equations above, itMV  is the market value of bank i ’s equity at time t , 
and itLeverage  is bank i ’s leverage defined as the ratio of total asset and equity 
market value at time t : it
i
t
i
t MVAsseetLeverage / . It is noted that when we 
calculate the asset return of the entire financial system in equation above, the 
individual bank’s asset return is value-weighted by its total asset proxied by the 
product of equity market value ( MV ) and leverage at time 1t . 
 1tZ  is the vector of macroeconomic and finance factors in the previous week, 
including market return, equity volatility, liquidity risk, interest risk, term structure, 
default risk and real-estate return. We obtain the value-weighted market returns from 
the database of S&P 500 Index CRSP Indices Daily. We use the weekly 
value-weighted equity returns (excluding ADRs) with all distributions to proxy for the 
market return. Volatility is the standard deviation of log market returns. Liquidity risk 
is the difference between the three-month LIBOR rate and the three-month T-bill rate. 
For the next three interest rate variables we calculate the changes from this week t  
to 1t . Interest rate risk is the change in the three-month T-bill rate. Term structure is 
the change in the slope of the yield curve (yield spread between the 10-year T-bond 
rate and the three-month T-bill rate). Default risk is the change in the credit spread 
between the 10-year BAA corporate bonds and the 10-year T-bond rate. All interest 
rate data is obtained from the U.S. Federal Reserve website and compustat Daily 
Treasury database. Real estate return is proxied by the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency’s FHFA House Price Index for all 50 U.S. states. 
 Hence we predict an individual bank’s VaR  and median asset return using the 
coefficients iˆ , iˆ , mediani,ˆ  and mediani,ˆ  estimated from the quantile regressions 
of equation (AP 1) and (AP 3): 
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 The vector of state variables 1tZ  is the same as in equation (AP 1) and (AP 3). 
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After obtaining the unconditional VaR s of an individual bank i  (
i
tqVaR , ) and that 
bank’s asset return in its median state ( medianitR
, ) from equation (10) and (11), we 
predict the systemic risk conditional on bank i  in distress (
isystem
qCoVaR
|
) using the 
coefficients isystem|ˆ , isystem|ˆ , isystem|ˆ  estimated from the quantile regression of 
equation (AP 2). 
 Specifically, 
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 Similarly, we can calculate the systemic risk conditional on bank i  functioning 
in its median state (
medianisystem
qCoVaR
,|
) as: 
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 Bank i ’s contribution to systemic risk is the difference between the financial 
system’s VaR  if bank i  is at risk and the financial system’s VaR  if bank i  is in 
its median state: 
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 Note that this is same as equation (4) with an additional subscript t  to denote 
the time-varying nature of the systemic risk in the banking system. As shown in the 
quantile regressions of equation (AP 1) and (AP 3), we are interested in the VaR  at 
the 1% confident level, therefore the systemic risk of individual bank at %1q  can 
be written as: 
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Appendix B 
Variable Description 
Dependent Variables           
Delta CoVaR 
ΔCoVaR, which is defined as the difference between the conditional value at risk of the financial system, is conditional on an institution being in distress (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2008). Here the ΔCoVaR is the difference between the CoVaR conditional on a bank 
being in distress and the CoVaR conditional on a bank operating in its median state. 
SES 
SES is short for Systemic Expected Shortfall (Acharya et al., 2010). 
It is the expected amount that a bank is undercapitalized in a systemic event in which the entire financial system is undercapitalized.  
Regulation Dummy           
Basel III Dummy The dummy for BASEL III enaction. It equals to 1 after year 2009, and 0 otherwise. 
Liquidity Regressors           
Adjusted Speed of Liquidity Creation 
Liquidity creation is bank's liquidity indicator, defined by Berger and Bouwman (2009). We apply partial adjustment model to measure the speed of banks' reaction to BASEL regulation. Every bank has an overall time-invariant adjustment speed (Oztekin and Flannery, 
2012).  
Adjusted Speed of I_NSFR 
I_NSFR is the inverse of Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), which is another liquidity indicator. Detailed definition can refer to Distinguin, Roulet, Tarazi (2013). We apply partial adjustment model to measure the speed of banks' reaction to BASEL regulation. Every 
bank has an overall time-invariant adjustment speed (Oztekin and Flannery, 2012).  
Control Variables           
Bank Size Bank size is defined as the natural logrithm of individual's total assets. 
Capital Ratio Capital ratio is the ratio of bank capital and reserves to total assets. Capital and reserves include funds contributed by owners, retained earnings, general and special reserves, provisions, and valuation adjustments. 
Diversification Ratio Diversification is defined as noninterest income divided by total operation income. 
Local Market Power Local market power is defined as the deposit concentration for the local markets in which the bank is present (Berger and Bouwman, 2013) 
ROA ROA is the profitability indicator, which is bank's return on assets. 
Non-Performing Loans Non-performing loans is the amount of loans past due 90 days divided by total assets. 
Off Balance Sheet Activities Off balance sheet activities are the amount of bank's off balance sheet activities divided by total assets. 
Loan Loss Provisions The amount of expense set aside as an allowance for bad loans (customer defaults, or terms of a loan have to be renegotiated, etc), divided by total assets. 
Real GDP Growth Rate Annual GDP growth rate. 
Inflation Rate Annual inflation rate 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics for All Sample Banks 
This table shows the descriptive statistics, including mean, median, 25% and 75% quantile, and standard deviation of our panel data with 2191 commercial banks during the period of 1997 to 2012, contributing to a total observation of 15455. 
Dependent variables are two systemic risk measurements: i) ΔCoVaR which is defined as the difference between the conditional value at risk of the financial system conditional on an institution being in distress (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2008); 
and ii) SES which is short for Systemic Expected Shortfall (Acharya et al., 2010), defined as the expected amount that a bank is undercapitalized in a systemic event in which the entire financial system is undercapitalized. Key regressors are two 
liquidity reaction variables: the adjusted speeds of i) liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2009); and ii) inverse of NSFR which is the inverse of net stable funding ratio (BIS, 2009). The adjusted speed is used to measure individual bank's 
reaction to Basel regulation, estimated by partial adjusted model (Ozeekin and Flannery, 2012). We use Basel III dummy to indicate the implement of the regulation. It equals to 1 after year 2009, and 0 otherwise. Control Variables include: 1) bank 
size, 2) capital ratio, 3) diversification, 4) local market power, 5) ROA, 6) non-performing loans, 7) off balance sheet activities, 8) loan loss provisions, 9) real GDP growth, 10) inflation rate. Variables definitions are provided in Appendix B.  
Variable Mean SD 25% 50% 75% 
Dependent Variables 
    
Delta CoVaR 3.48  3.24  1.34  2.55  4.50  
SES 1.92  3.24  1.65  1.97  4.50  
Regulation Dummy 
    
Basel III Dummy 0.13  0.33  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Liquidity Regressors 
    
Adjusted Speed of Liquidity Creation 0.21  0.26  0.09  0.14  0.25  
Adjusted Speed of NSFR 0.25  0.18  0.18  0.28  0.33  
Control Variables 
    
Bank Size 13.09  1.77  11.88  12.89  14.03  
Capital Ratio 0.11  0.11  0.08  0.09  0.11  
Diversification Ratio 0.59 3.36  0.08  0.13  0.21  
Local Market Power 0.04  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.06  
ROA 0.01  0.06  0.01  0.01  0.01  
Non-Performing Loans 0.37  1.87  0.00  0.81  1.12  
Off Balance Sheet Activities 0.27  1.01  0.09  0.95  1.26  
Loan Loss Provisions 22.45  0.74  8.82  14.79 29.25 
Real GDP Growth Rate 2.85  1.79  1.79  3.35  4.45  
Inflation Rate 1.97  0.66  1.53  1.96  2.28  
Observations 15455 
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Table 2 The Impact of Adjusted Speed of Liquidity on Systemic Risk 
This table shows the results of our baseline model with fixed effects during 1997 to 2012, which is the 
estimation of impact of adjusted speed of liquidity indicator including liquidity creation (measured by the 
amount of securitized assets divided by total assets) and inverse of net stable funding ratio (NSFR) on 
systemic risk measurements including delta CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2008) and SES (Acharya 
et al., 2010). Delta CoVaR is the difference between the CoVaR conditional on a bank being in distress 
and the CoVaR conditional on a bank operating in its median state, while SES is the expected amount that 
a bank is undercapitalized in a systemic event in which the entire financial system is undercapitalized. We 
measure individual bank's reaction to Basel regulation using "adjusted speed of liquidity", estimated by 
partial adjusted model (Ozeekin and Flannery, 2012). Adjusted speed measures the speed of individuals to 
adjust their liquidity according to Basel regulation. We use Basel III dummy to indicate the implement of 
the regulation. It equals to 1 after year 2009, and 0 otherwise. Control Variables include: 1) bank size, 2) 
capital ratio, 3) diversification, 4) local market power, 5) ROA, 6) non-performing loans, 7) off balance 
sheet activities, 8) loan loss provisions, 9) real GDP growth, 10) inflation rate. Variables definitions are 
provided in Appendix B. We also provide information about whether the model contains controls for bank 
and time fixed effect. To deal with the possible time series issue, all the control variables have been lagged 
for one year. T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the bank level, where *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Dependent Variable Delta CoVaR SES 
Liquidity Indicator Liquidity Creation NSFR 
Adjusted Speed of Liquidity Indicator 0.646 -0.679 0.108* -0.0450 
 
(0.38) (0.59) (0.05) (0.08) 
Basel III Dummy -1.309*** -1.245*** -0.295*** -0.219*** 
 
(0.29) (0.36) (0.04) (0.05) 
Adjusted Speed * Basel III -0.683*** -0.669*** -0.246*** -0.413*** 
 
(0.36) (0.74) (0.05) (0.10) 
Bank Size 0.191*** 0.188*** 0.0523*** 0.0510*** 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Ratio 2.112*** 2.162*** 0.553*** 0.553*** 
 
(0.78) (0.78) (0.10) (0.11) 
Diversification Ratio 0.558 0.582 0.108 0.120 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Local Market Power -9.348** -9.269** -1.423** -1.409** 
 
(3.23) (3.23) (0.44) (0.44) 
ROA 0.946 0.950 0.110 0.110 
 
(0.59) (0.59) (0.08) (0.08) 
Non-Performing Loans 0.212** 0.213** 0.518** 0.519** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Off Balance Sheet Activities 0.575 0.563 0.109 0.108 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Loan Loss Provisions -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.314*** -0.322*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Real GDP Growth Rate 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
Inflation Rate 0.124* 0.129* 0.023* 0.024* 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 0.943*** 1.289*** 1.205*** 1.258*** 
  (0.98) (0.98) (0.13) (0.13) 
Bank Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13043 13043 13043 13043 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0914 0.0918 0.0326 0.0317 
 
30 
 
Table 3: Panel A Determinants of Banks' Propensity Scores 
This table presents the probit regression estimates of the propensity to provide high liquidity adjusted speed. The 
dependent variable equals to one for banks with high liquidity adjusted speed (the value higher than average) and zero 
otherwise. We use two liquidity adjusted speeds representing the two indicators, liquidity creation and net stable fund 
ratio. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. The reported standard errors are clustered at the bank level. *, **, 
*** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
High Liquidity Adjusted Speed Dummy 
Liquidity Creation -1.000*** 0.172*** 
 
(0.14) (0.10) 
Bank Size -0.065*** -0.069*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Ratio -0.680*** -0.674*** 
 
(0.12) (0.12) 
Diversification Ratio 0.149* 0.139* 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Local Market Power 5.986*** 5.564*** 
 
(0.56) (0.58) 
ROA -1.665*** -1.644*** 
 
(0.34) (0.34) 
Non-Performing Loans -0.877 -0.101 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Off Balance Sheet Activities 1.259*** 1.339*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Loan Loss Provisions -8.298 -7.318 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.267** -0.041*** 
  (0.10) (0.07) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -9290.2551 -9316.2232 
Observations 15453 15453 
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Table 3: Panel B Additional Analysis 1: Propensity Score Matching by Liquidity Level 
This table shows additional analysis 1 concerning whether adjusted speeds of liquidity indicators 
matter to systemic measurements compared with liquidity level. Systemic risk measurements 
including delta CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2008) and SES (Acharya et al., 2010). Delta 
CoVaR is the difference between the CoVaR conditional on a bank being in distress and the CoVaR 
conditional on a bank operating in its median state, while SES is the expected amount that a bank is 
undercapitalized in a systemic event in which the entire financial system is undercapitalized. We use 
propensity score matching method to match similar liquidity levels between low and high liquidity 
adjusted speeds individuals. Liquidity indicators include liquidity creation (measured by the amount 
of securitized assets divided by total assets) and inverse of net stable funding ratio (NSFR). High 
speed individuals are those banks with adjusted speeds higher than average, while low individuals are 
those ones lower than average. We match two groups of banks by liquidity creation or NSFR, and 
related bank specific variables. Variables definitions are provided in Appendix B. Information of 
observations, treated and untreated values of systemic risk measurements and the differences are 
presented in the table. 
A: Matching by liquidity creation level   
  Observations Treated Untreated Difference 
Delta CoVaR 4642 3.022  3.618  -0.596***  
SES 4642 1.823  1.950  -0.126***  
     B: Matching by NSFR level  
  Observations Treated Untreated Difference 
Delta CoVaR 3828 2.991  3.382  -0.391***  
SES 3828 1.813  1.887  -0.073***  
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Table 4 The Impact of Liquidity Indicators on Systemic Risk 
This table shows the results of our additional analysis 3 with fixed effects during 1997 to 2012, which is the 
estimation of impact of liquidity indicators including liquidity creation (measured by the amount of securitized 
assets divided by total assets) and inverse of net stable funding ratio (NSFR) on systemic risk measurements 
including delta CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2008) and SES (Acharya et al., 2010). Delta CoVaR is the 
difference between the CoVaR conditional on a bank being in distress and the CoVaR conditional on a bank 
operating in its median state, while SES is the expected amount that a bank is undercapitalized in a systemic event 
in which the entire financial system is undercapitalized. We use Basel III dummy to indicate the implement of the 
regulation. It equals to 1 after year 2009, and 0 otherwise. Control Variables include: 1) bank size, 2) capital ratio, 
3) diversification, 4) local market power, 5) ROA, 6) non-performing loans, 7) off balance sheet activities, 8) loan 
loss provisions, 9) real GDP growth, 10) inflation rate. Variables definitions are provided in Appendix B. We also 
provide information about whether the model contains controls for bank and time fixed effect. To deal with the 
possible time series issue, all the control variables have been lagged for one year. T-statistics are based on standard 
errors clustered at the bank level, where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable Delta CoVaR SES 
Liquidity Indicator Liquidity Creation NSFR 
Liquidity Indicators 0.621 0.209 0.336 0.523 
 
(0.76) (0.31) (0.10) (0.04) 
Basel III Dummy -1.233*** -1.361*** -0.411*** -0.353*** 
 
(0.33) (0.29) (0.05) (0.04) 
Liquidity Indicators * Basel III 1.593 0.528 0.274 0.419 
 
(1.21) (0.68) (0.17) (0.09) 
Bank Size 0.190*** 0.184*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Ratio 2.152** 2.115** 0.551*** 0.549*** 
 
(0.78) (0.78) (0.10) (0.11) 
Diversification Ratio 63.867 59.129 10.918 11.728 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Local Market Power -9.201** -9.425** -1.419** -1.398** 
 
(3.23) (3.24) (0.44) (0.44) 
ROA 0.970 0.958 0.116 0.109 
 
(0.59) (0.59) (0.08) (0.08) 
Non-Performing Loans 0.222** 0.219** 0.524** 0.527** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Off Balance Sheet Activities 0.575 0.562 0.113 0.106 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Loan Loss Provisions -0.157** -0.152** -0.308** -0.310** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Real GDP Growth Rate 0.054 0.115* 0.024*** 0.014 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01) 
Inflation Rate 0.122** 0.156** 0.029** 0.023* 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 1.068*** 0.905*** 1.180*** 1.267*** 
 
(0.98) (1.00) (0.13) (0.14) 
Bank Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13093 13093 13043 13043 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0918 0.0919 0.0318 0.0303 
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Table 5A The Impact of Adjusted Speed of Liquidity Indicators on Systemic Measurements among Small 
Banks 
This table shows the additional analysis results with fixed effects during 1997 to 2012, which is the estimation of impact of 
adjusted speed of liquidity indicator including liquidity creation (measured by the amount of securitized assets divided by 
total assets) and inverse of net stable funding ratio (NSFR) on systemic risk measurements including delta CoVaR (Adrian 
and Brunnermeier, 2008) and SES (Acharya et al., 2010), among banks with different sizes. Small banks are those banks 
have a total asset less than $3 billion, medium banks are those banks with total assets between $3 billion and $10 billion, and 
large banks are those have total assets more than $10 billion. Results are reported in Table 4A, 4B, and 4C, respectively. 
Delta CoVaR is the difference between the CoVaR conditional on a bank being in distress and the CoVaR conditional on a 
bank operating in its median state, while SES is the expected amount that a bank is undercapitalized in a systemic event in 
which the entire financial system is undercapitalized. We measure individual bank's reaction to Basel regulation using 
"adjusted speed of liquidity", estimated by partial adjusted model (Ozeekin and Flannery, 2012). Adjusted speed measures 
the speed of individuals to adjust their liquidity according to Basel regulation. We use Basel III dummy to indicate the 
implement of the regulation. It equals to 1 after year 2009, and 0 otherwise. Control Variables include: 1) bank size, 2) 
capital ratio, 3) diversification, 4) local market power, 5) ROA, 6) non-performing loans, 7) off balance sheet activities, 8) 
loan loss provisions, 9) real GDP growth, 10) inflation rate. Variables definitions are provided in Appendix B. We also 
provide information about whether the model contains controls for bank and time fixed effect. To deal with the possible time 
series issue, all the control variables have been lagged for one year. T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the 
bank level, where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Dependent Variable Delta CoVaR SES 
Liquidity Indicator Liquidity Creation NSFR 
Adjusted Speed of Liquidity Indicator 0.578 -0.950 0.0416 -0.0348 
 
(0.41) (0.75) (0.05) (0.10) 
Basel III Dummy -1.852*** -1.793*** -0.273*** -0.175*** 
 
(0.35) (0.42) (0.04) (0.05) 
Adjusted Speed * Basel III -0.596*** -0.615*** -0.232*** -0.464*** 
 
(0.40) (0.82) (0.05) (0.11) 
Bank Size 0.428*** 0.425*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Ratio 2.705** 2.743** 0.635*** 0.626*** 
 
(0.89) (0.89) (0.12) (0.12) 
Diversification Ratio 23.521 24.638 6.037 7.133 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Local Market Power -8.571* -8.554* -1.049* -1.053* 
 
(3.48) (3.48) (0.46) (0.46) 
ROA 0.660 0.660 0.601 0.398 
 
(0.60) (0.60) (0.08) (0.08) 
Non-Performing Loans -6.164** -6.184** -5.266** -5.473** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Off Balance Sheet Activities 0.131 0.134 -0.024 -0.028 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Loan Loss Provisions -33.326*** -33.939*** -12.106*** -12.217*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Real GDP Growth Rate -0.041* -0.044* 0.011* 0.010* 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) 
Inflation Rate -0.013 -0.009 0.002 0.004 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -1.242 -0.824 0.527*** 0.572*** 
 
(1.25) (1.25) (0.16) (0.16) 
Bank Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11180 11180 11136 11136 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1079 0.1081 0.0441 0.0440 
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Table 5B The Impact of Adjusted Speed of Liquidity Indicators on Systemic 
Measurements among Medium Banks 
Dependent Variable Delta CoVaR SES 
Liquidity Indicator Liquidity Creation NSFR 
Adjusted Speed of Liquidity Indicator 0.691 -1.446 0.260 -0.446 
 
(1.26) (1.61) (0.20) (0.25) 
Basel III Dummy -3.832*** -3.712*** -1.228*** -1.125*** 
 
(0.35) (0.42) (0.04) (0.05) 
Adjusted Speed * Basel III -0.261 -0.582 -0.159 0.431 
 
(1.68) (2.78) (0.27) (0.44) 
Bank Size -0.330*** -0.319*** -0.067*** -0.065*** 
 
(0.33) (0.33) (0.05) (0.05) 
Capital Ratio -7.366*** -7.480*** -0.785*** -0.791*** 
 
(5.04) (5.04) (0.80) (0.80) 
Diversification Ratio 0.021 0.018 0.040 0.040 
 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.03) (0.03) 
Local Market Power -3.630 -3.367 -1.263 -1.254 
 
(10.17) (10.13) (1.62) (1.61) 
ROA 3.658 3.382 5.323* 5.179* 
 
(13.41) (13.41) (2.17) (2.17) 
Non-Performing Loans 3.912*** 3.993*** 1.401*** 1.238*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Off Balance Sheet Activities -0.688 -0.856 0.586 0.548 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Loan Loss Provisions -3.072*** -3.139*** -0.979*** -0.974*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Real GDP Growth Rate 0.030 0.013 0.019 0.040 
 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.02) (0.03) 
Inflation Rate 0.578* 0.566* 0.078* 0.089* 
 
(0.25) (0.26) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 7.969 8.370 2.807*** 2.810*** 
 
(5.15) (5.16) (0.82) (0.82) 
Bank Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1059 1059 1055 1055 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1590 0.1582 0.0724 0.0747 
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Table 5C. The Impact of Adjusted Speed of Liquidity Indicators on Systemic 
Measurements among Large Banks 
Dependent Variable Delta CoVaR SES 
Liquidity Indicator Liquidity Creation NSFR 
Adjusted Speed of Liquidity Indicator -1.438 0.033 -0.037 -0.028 
 
(1.77) (1.21) (0.24) (0.16) 
Basel III Dummy -2.232*** -2.212*** -0.628*** -0.725*** 
 
(0.35) (0.42) (0.04) (0.05) 
Adjusted Speed * Basel III -2.878 -1.082 -0.362 -0.095 
 
(2.08) (2.64) (0.28) (0.35) 
Bank Size 0.285 0.211 0.070 0.055 
 
(0.30) (0.29) (0.04) (0.04) 
Capital Ratio -1.447*** -0.277*** 0.501*** 0.733*** 
 
(4.01) (4.00) (0.54) (0.53) 
Diversification Ratio 1.973*** 1.628*** 0.636*** 0.555*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Local Market Power -36.39 -36.23 -2.573 -2.560 
 
(25.16) (25.19) (3.36) (3.36) 
ROA 16.072*** 13.947*** 5.875*** 5.349*** 
 
(14.63) (14.54) (1.95) (1.94) 
Non-Performing Loans 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Off Balance Sheet Activities 0.423*** 0.438*** 0.095*** 0.098*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Loan Loss Provisions -45.512 -39.205 -7.283 -8.516 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Real GDP Growth Rate 0.124 0.119 0.074* 0.062 
 
(0.25) (0.27) (0.03) (0.04) 
Inflation Rate 0.765 0.774 0.024 0.023 
 
(0.40) (0.40) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant -1.355 -0.378 0.466 0.746 
 
(5.21) (4.97) (0.70) (0.66) 
Bank Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 854 854 852 852 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0267 0.0293 0.1450 0.1425 
 
